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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Judith and Kenneth Goldman filed a motion in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to vacate an adverse arbitration award.  The 
underlying arbitration, before a panel operating under the 
auspices of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”), concerned the Goldmans’ allegations that 
financial advisor Barry Guariglia and Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc. had violated federal securities law in their 
management of the Goldmans’ brokerage accounts.  The 
District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction because the Goldmans’ motion failed to raise a 
substantial federal question.  We will affirm. 
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I. Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
This case has its roots in the relationship between the 
Goldmans and their former financial advisor, Mr. Guariglia, a 
relationship that began in the 1990s, when he was working for 
the wealth management firm Merrill Lynch.  In 2008, 
Guariglia changed his employment to Merrill Lynch’s 
competitor Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“CGMI”), and he 
persuaded the Goldmans to follow him there.1   
 
After the Goldmans lost money in the stock market, 
they alleged that they were pushed into “short-term trading of 
high-risk, speculative securities” that were “far outside [their] 
investment objectives,” and that Merrill Lynch and CGMI 
and their employees “knew it.”  (App. 17.)  They also alleged 
that Guariglia and his colleagues induced the Goldmans to 
take on ever more unsustainable risk by trading on margin.  
Most important to the case at bar, the Goldmans contend that, 
when they transferred their account from Merrill Lynch 
(where they say they received favorable margin requirement 
treatment) to CGMI (where they allegedly faced a higher 
margin requirement), they were subjected to a “devastating 
margin call,” leading to the liquidation of a “sizable portion 
of their investments” and “the loss of their entire retirement.”  
(Opening Br. at 7.) 
 
                                              
1 CGMI has since changed its name to Morgan Stanley 
Smith Barney LLC.  The Goldmans maintained accounts with 
a unit of CGMI then called Smith Barney.   
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B. Procedural Background 
 
1. Arbitration Proceedings before 
 FINRA 
 
Based on those allegations, in 2010 the Goldmans 
initiated FINRA arbitration proceedings against Merrill 
Lynch, CGMI, Guariglia, and other employees of those 
financial institutions.  They asserted claims on the following 
bases: securities fraud in violation of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the “’34 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., and Rule 
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; fraudulent misrepresentation; 
lack of supervision of employees; lack of suitability of 
investment recommendations; breach of fiduciary duty; 
breach of contract; and negligence. 
 
The FINRA proceedings began with mediation before 
a neutral named Ferdinand Pieroni, and the mediation 
succeeded in producing a settlement for the Goldmans with 
Merrill Lynch, but not with CGMI.2  The Goldmans now 
allege that CGMI refused to negotiate in good faith, left the 
mediation when the Goldmans so demanded, and then “snuck 
back in[] ... through a side door” to “spy” on the confidential 
negotiations between the Goldmans and Merrill Lynch.  
(Opening Br. at 9.)  CGMI flatly denies those allegations, and 
mediator Pieroni filed a sworn affirmation before the FINRA 
arbitration panel declaring that CGMI did not refuse to 
mediate, was never asked to leave the mediation, and acted in 
good faith.   
 
                                              
2 At this point and hereafter, for simplicity, we will 
refer to Guariglia and CGMI collectively as “CGMI.” 
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The arbitration panel took evidence and heard 
argument for 10 days between August 2012 and February 
2014.  After the Goldmans presented their full case in chief, 
CGMI moved to dismiss for lack of evidence.  The panel 
granted the motion, concluding that, “[w]hile all the claims 
were quite stridently argued, not a single claim was proven to 
be true by evidence.”  (App. 109.)  In particular, the panel 
noted that the Goldmans “failed to offer a scintilla of proof” 
that they were subject to a margin call.  (Id.)  The panel thus 
determined that “there was no margin call” (id.), and, on 
October 2, 2014, it issued a final award dismissing the 
Goldmans’ claims and assigning administrative fees among 
the parties.   
 
2. District Court Proceedings 
 
During the mediation and arbitration proceedings 
before FINRA, the Goldmans resorted to the District Court, 
claiming a breach of contract.  More specifically, in a lengthy 
complaint, the Goldmans alleged that CGMI had not honored 
its promise to mediate, that “CGMI and its lawyers were 
allowed to spy on ... confidential discussion[s] and 
negotiation[s]” (App. 47), and that the arbitration panel was 
conflicted and partial.  Based on those allegations, the 
complaint alleged that CGMI, Guariglia, FINRA, and Pieroni 
“breached express and implied terms and conditions of the 
FINRA[] Arbitration and Mediation contracts” (App. 49), and 
acted “[i]n utter defiance of [FINRA mediation] rules” (App. 
50).  They immediately moved for a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction to stay the arbitration and to 
have CGMI’s law firm, Greenberg Traurig, barred from the 
case.  The District Court denied the motion, holding that there 
was “no lawful basis” for relief and that the Goldmans had 
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improperly asked the Court to intervene “as an emergency 
court of interlocutory appeals from arbitration orders.”  (App. 
85.)  After a different judge was assigned the case, the 
District Court denied a second motion for a temporary 
restraining order, then subsequently dismissed the case with 
instructions to re-file after the arbitration was concluded, if 
the Goldmans wished to challenge any resulting arbitration 
award.  There was another false start in the summer of 2014, 
when the Goldmans filed a motion to vacate the arbitration 
award before it was actually finalized, and that motion too 
was dismissed.   
 
 When the arbitration was finally completed, the 
Goldmans returned to the District Court by submitting what 
they styled as a “refiled” motion to vacate the arbitration 
award, which is the motion now at issue.3  In their motion, 
they asserted that the District Court had jurisdiction under 
§ 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10, 
                                              
3 The FAA provides that “the United States court in 
and for the district wherein the award was made may make an 
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  “Notice of a motion to 
vacate ... must be served upon the adverse party or his 
attorney within three months after the award is filed or 
delivered.”  9 U.S.C. § 12.  Therefore, unlike in most federal 
actions that are initiated with a complaint, when a litigant is 
seeking to vacate an arbitration award under the FAA, “such a 
request for relief shall be made in the form of a motion,” and 
a party need not “initiate a challenge to an arbitration award 
by filing a complaint.”  O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof'l Planning 
Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 745 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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and, to justify vacatur of the award, they alleged that the 
FINRA arbitration panel behaved improperly in that it 
demanded “voluminous” and irrelevant discovery from them 
(App. 289), did not permit sufficient discovery of CGMI’s 
documents, exhibited partiality towards CGMI, and “refused 
to resign” at the Goldmans’ request (App. 295).  The 
Goldmans also alleged that CGMI’s counsel negotiated in bad 
faith and then spied on the meditation proceedings, and that 
the mediator perjured himself in denying that the spying 
occurred.  Resorting to the typographical arts and extravagant 
language, the Goldmans practically shout that 
 
the treatment of the FINRA members 
demonstrates to the reasonable person that 
unavoidably, the Panel was partial to one side 
and the favorable treatment unilateral. ... 
Defendants use the “BIG LIE” to maximize the 
advantage they enjoyed in the FINRA forum as 
a FINRA member and associated member. ... 
The Biggest of the “Big Lies” is Defendants’ 
persistent perjury that “THERE WAS NO 
MARGIN CALL” upon transfer of the 
Goldman accounts from Merrill Lynch to 
Defendants in November 2008. 
 
(App. 297-98 (original emphasis and formatting).) 
 
In response to the motion to vacate, CGMI moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).4  The District Court 
                                              
4 While litigation proceeded in the District Court, 
CGMI separately sought confirmation of the FINRA 
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granted that motion.  Its opinion began by observing that the 
FAA does not itself create federal subject-matter jurisdiction 
and that the parties in this case are not diverse, so that federal 
question jurisdiction, independent of the FAA, would be 
required for the District Court to consider a motion to vacate 
an arbitration award.  The Court then rejected the three bases 
for federal question jurisdiction that the Goldmans press 
before us.  It also denied their motion for leave to file an 
amended motion to vacate because, in seeking leave to 
amend, they simply sought to “assert the same claims they 
unsuccessfully brought in their arbitration before FINRA.”5  
(App. 3 n.1.) 
                                                                                                     
arbitration award in the Superior Court of Essex County, New 
Jersey.  After the District Court dismissed the Goldmans’ 
case for lack of jurisdiction, the New Jersey Superior Court 
granted the motion to confirm the arbitration award pursuant 
to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:24-7, which provides that 
“confirmation shall be granted unless the award is vacated, 
modified or corrected.”  The Goldmans have appealed that 
order, and the appeal is pending in the New Jersey courts.  Of 
note, “[t]he grounds for vacating an arbitration award under 
[New Jersey law] are identical to those set forth ... for 
vacating an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration 
Act.”  In re City of Camden, 58 A.3d 1186, 1204 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
5 In cursory fashion, the Goldmans ask us to reverse 
the District Court’s order denying them leave to file an 
amended motion to vacate.  They make no specific argument, 
however, for why the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying them leave to amend.  See Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“We review a district court decision refusing 
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The Goldmans timely appealed.  
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction is precisely 
the issue on appeal.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s dismissal of an action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. 
TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Because CGMI’s attack on jurisdiction is facial, we consider 
only the allegations in the motion to vacate and the 
documents referenced in that motion and attached thereto, “in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The Goldmans argue that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,6 which provides 
                                                                                                     
leave to amend ... for abuse of discretion.”).  Because 
“arguments raised in passing ..., but not squarely argued, are 
considered waived,” John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l 
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997), any argument 
about leave to amend “need not be addressed” by us, Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
6 In their reply brief, the Goldmans also belatedly 
assert that the kind of claim they are bringing is “exclusive to 
federal courts under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a).”  (Reply Br. at 6.)  
That provision provides exclusive jurisdiction to federal 
district courts for “all suits in equity and actions at law 
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jurisdiction for “civil actions arising under” federal law.7  
Such “federal question” jurisdiction may arise in two ways.  
“Most directly, a case arises under federal law when federal 
law creates the cause of action asserted.”  Gunn v. Minton, 
133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (citing American Well Works 
Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).  
However, even if the cause of action is based on state law, 
there is a “special and small category of cases in which 
arising under jurisdiction still lies.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In those special cases, which depend for 
jurisdiction on the analysis set forth in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005), 
“federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal 
issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) 
substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court 
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by 
Congress.”  Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065 (summarizing the 
                                                                                                     
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the ’34 
Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 78aa(a).  The Supreme Court, however, recently confirmed 
our Circuit’s holding that 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) should be “read 
... as conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction of the same 
suits as ‘aris[e] under’ the [’34 Act]  pursuant to the general 
federal question statute.”  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith Inc. v. Manning, No. 14-1132, 2016 WL 2842450, at 
*5 (U.S. May 16, 2016).  We therefore apply the “arising 
under” analysis for 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to this case. 
 
7 Both sides agree that diversity jurisdiction does not 
apply in this case, as the Goldmans and Guariglia are all 
citizens of New Jersey.   
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jurisdictional test set forth in Grable).  For both forms of 
federal question jurisdiction – the ordinary variety and the 
rarer Grable type – the party asserting jurisdiction must 
satisfy the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which mandates 
that the grounds for jurisdiction be clear on the face of the 
pleading that initiates the case.  Franchise Tax Bd. of State of 
Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 
9-11 (1983).  In short, “a well-pleaded complaint establishes 
either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of 
a substantial question of federal law.”  Id. at 27-28. 
 
The FAA does not itself provide a federal cause of 
action for vacatur of an arbitration award.  Instead, as the 
Supreme Court has explained, 
 
[t]he Arbitration Act is something of an 
anomaly in the field of federal-court 
jurisdiction.  It creates a body of federal 
substantive law establishing and regulating the 
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it 
does not create any independent federal-
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 
otherwise. ... [H]ence, there must be diversity of 
citizenship or some other independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction before [an] order can issue.  
... [A]lthough enforcement of the Act is left in 
large part to the state courts, it nevertheless 
represents federal policy to be vindicated by the 
federal courts where otherwise appropriate. 
 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also 
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V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 
911, 915 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Arbitration Act does not 
supply federal jurisdiction where it does not otherwise 
exist.”).8  Therefore, the FAA does not provide a federal 
cause of action to ground subject-matter jurisdiction for the 
Goldmans’ motion to vacate. 
 
 We must look, then, to the Goldmans’ allegations to 
see whether they somehow raise a basis for jurisdiction, other 
than by the incorrect assertion that § 10 independently 
provided the District Court “jurisdiction to hear and decide” 
the motion to vacate.  (App. 287.)  Because the Goldmans’ 
“‘refiled’ motion to vacate” is the filing that brought the 
dispute to the District Court after the Court had dismissed 
their requests to stay the arbitration proceedings, the 
allegations of that motion are the ones to which we apply the 
well-pleaded complaint rule.  (App. 284.)  Though that 
motion meanders, it does make something apparent: the 
Goldmans point to no federal law as the reason there should 
be a vacatur.  Instead, they reference Pennsylvania state law 
governing vacatur of arbitration awards and then proceed to 
discuss the indignities they allegedly suffered during the 
arbitration proceedings.  Lengthy though the motion to vacate 
is, it is entirely about the arbitration process.  The Goldmans 
complain of a “bitter prehearing arbitration discovery 
process” (App. 289), “evident partiality of the [arbitration] 
                                              
8 The Goldmans argue that the “plain language” of 
§ 10 of the FAA creates a federal cause of action and that we 
should read it to do so to give it “the dignity of plain 
meaning.”  (Opening Br. at 24.)  They acknowledge, 
however, that their interpretation is contrary to our precedent, 
so we do not consider that argument further.   
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Panel” (App. 290), “paltry” discovery production from CGMI 
(App. 291), CGMI being “allowed to spy” on confidential 
mediation negotiations (App. 292), the mediator’s alleged 
perjury, the arbitration panel’s “manifest[] disregard[] [of] the 
existence of a margin call” (App. 298), “falsification of 
records” (App. 299), and “contemptuous treatment by the 
Panel Chair of the Goldmans” (App. 301).  All of those 
grievances are variations on the theme that the contract to 
arbitrate was undermined by “blatant misconduct by” CGMI, 
despite CGMI’s obligation “to arbitrate properly under the 
FINRA A[rbitration] Submission Agreement,” and that 
CGMI’s misconduct was “insidiously tolerated by a panel 
sworn to be impartial.”  (App. 300 (emphasis omitted).)  The 
essence of the motion to vacate is therefore a breach of 
contract complaint, alleging that CGMI, with the aid of the 
FINRA panel, engaged in procedural chicanery and failed to 
honor the agreement to arbitrate.  That basic contract claim 
arises under state, not federal, law. 
 
Lacking a federal cause of action to support 
jurisdiction, the Goldmans must rely on Grable to establish 
that their “state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a ... federal 
issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum 
may entertain without disturbing any congressionally 
approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.”  545 U.S. at 314.  They present three 
theories for why their motion to vacate does so.  First, they 
say that federal courts may “look through” a motion to vacate 
to the subject matter of the underlying arbitration, and that, 
because the underlying arbitration in this case involved 
federal securities law claims, the District Court had 
jurisdiction.  Second, they contend that, because they alleged 
that the FINRA panel manifestly disregarded federal law, 
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they have raised a federal question.  Finally, they say that the 
FINRA procedures at issue here are so integrally related to 
federal law that disputes over those procedures raise federal 
questions.  We consider each jurisdictional theory in turn, 
ultimately agreeing with the District Court that none satisfies 
the stringent Grable test for federal question jurisdiction in 
the absence of a federal cause of action. 
 
A. Look-Through 
 
1. Athena Venture’s Jurisdictional 
 Statement 
 
To support their argument that a district court should 
“look through” a motion to vacate and examine the subject 
matter of the underlying arbitration, the Goldmans principally 
rely upon an opinion that our Court issued after the District 
Court dismissed the motion to vacate.  That opinion, from a 
case called Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture 
Partners, L.P., included a footnote indicating that a district 
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a § 10 motion to 
vacate “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) 
because the underlying arbitration included federal securities 
law claims.”  803 F.3d 144, 147 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
Were that statement of law binding on us, the 
Goldmans would be correct that the District Court had 
jurisdiction over their motion to vacate.  But we are not 
bound to follow Athena Venture, for two independently 
sufficient reasons. 
 
First, a summary and unexplained jurisdictional ruling 
like the one in that case has no precedential effect.  Using a 
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colloquialism, we have previously observed that “[a] drive-by 
jurisdictional ruling, in which jurisdiction has been assumed 
by the parties, and assumed without discussion by the court, 
does not create binding precedent.”  United States v. Stoerr, 
695 F.3d 271, 277 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation and 
editorial marks omitted).  “We therefore are not bound by the 
bald jurisdictional statement” in a prior opinion of our Court.  
Id.  That understanding comports with similar instruction 
from the Supreme Court, reaching back to Chief Justice 
Marshall, who held that there is nothing binding in “a prior 
exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned 
and it was passed sub silentio.”  United States v. L.A. Tucker 
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952); see also Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (“We 
have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings ... have no 
precedential effect.”). 
 
The Athena Venture footnote represents just such an 
unexamined exercise of jurisdiction and so is without 
precedential effect.  Jurisdiction was not disputed, and the 
case instead revolved entirely around a merits question of 
whether constructive knowledge of an arbitrator’s 
misrepresentation could trigger forfeiture of a misconduct 
claim in a subsequent motion to vacate.  See Athena Venture, 
803 F.3d at 147-48.  The jurisdictional footnote was merely a 
recapitulation of the jurisdictional statement from the 
appellants’ brief, which was itself unaddressed by the 
appellees.  Compare id. at 147 n.5 with Brief of Appellants at 
1, Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners, L.P., 
803 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3461), 2014 WL 
1315263.  Had the adversarial process properly put 
jurisdiction in issue, we doubt that the jurisdictional ruling 
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would have been the same.  Indeed, it could not have been,9 
which is the second reason that Athena Venture does not bind 
us on the question of jurisdiction: it is contrary to our own 
prior precedent. 
 
“In the unique circumstance when our panel decisions 
conflict and our Court has not spoken en banc, ... the earlier 
decision is generally the controlling authority.”  United States 
v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009).  Long before 
Athena Venture, in a case called Virgin Islands Housing 
Authority v. Coastal General Construction Services Corp., we 
applied the well-pleaded complaint rule to a § 10 motion to 
vacate and refused to look through to the claims in the 
underlying arbitration, so that jurisdiction would not lie where 
the allegations “did not include any reference to a federal 
statute other than the Arbitration Act.”  27 F.3d at 915.  
“[N]ot only must federal jurisdiction exist aside from the 
Arbitration Act, but the independent basis must appear on the 
face of the complaint.”  Id.  We found jurisdiction lacking 
where the pleadings did not “contain allegations sufficient 
under the well-pleaded complaint rule to support a finding of 
a substantial federal question.”  Id.  Therefore, even if the 
Athena Venture jurisdictional statement were anything more 
than our Court’s unexplained acceptance of the parties’ 
representations about jurisdiction, it would nonetheless be 
trumped by the prior holding in Coastal General. 
 
                                              
9 That is not to say that the Court could not have 
determined there was jurisdiction on some other theory, only 
that it could not have relied on the look-through theory. 
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2. Vaden and the Difference Between § 4 
 and § 10 of the FAA 
 
To overcome the precedential force of Coastal 
General, the Goldmans need to point to some intervening 
change in the law.  The closest they come is their invocation 
of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 
556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009), which held that “[a] federal court 
may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition [to compel arbitration] to 
determine whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises 
under’ federal law.”  The Goldmans argue that we should 
apply that same look-through treatment to § 10 motions to 
vacate arbitration awards.  While there may be some 
superficial appeal to treating a § 10 motion to vacate an 
arbitration award in the same manner as a § 4 motion to 
compel arbitration, a close reading of Vaden and the relevant 
provisions of the FAA undercuts the Goldmans’ argument. 
 
To begin with, the Vaden opinion made clear that it 
was doing nothing to disturb the well-pleaded complaint rule 
or the general proposition that the FAA provides no federal 
cause of action.  Specifically, the Court reaffirmed that 
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 works 
the same for FAA suits as for any others, so that, “[u]nder the 
longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, ... a suit ‘arises 
under’ federal law ‘only when the plaintiff’s statement of his 
own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal 
law].’”  Id. at 60 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)).  The Court also said, 
 
[t]he body of federal substantive law generated 
by [the FAA] is equally binding on state and 
federal courts.  ...  [The FAA] bestows no 
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federal jurisdiction but rather requires for access 
to a federal forum an independent jurisdictional 
basis over the parties’ dispute.  Given the 
substantive supremacy of the FAA, but the 
Act’s nonjurisdictional cast, state courts have a 
prominent role to play as enforcers of 
agreements to arbitrate. 
 
Id. at 59 (internal quotation marks, editorial marks, and 
citations omitted).   
 
In explaining why the well-pleaded complaint rule was 
relaxed for § 4 petitions to allow look-through to the 
underlying dispute’s subject-matter, the Court focused on the 
unique language of that portion of the statute, saying, “[t]he 
text of § 4 drives our conclusion that a federal court should 
determine its jurisdiction by ‘looking through’ a § 4 petition 
to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy.”  Id. at 62.  
According to that text: 
 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, 
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a 
written agreement for arbitration may petition 
any United States district court which, save for 
such agreement, would have jurisdiction under 
Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the 
subject matter of a suit arising out of the 
controversy between the parties, for an order 
directing that such arbitration proceed in the 
manner provided for in such agreement. 
 
9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court 
concluded that “[t]he phrase ‘save for [the arbitration] 
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agreement’ indicates that the district court should assume the 
absence of the arbitration agreement and determine whether it 
‘would have jurisdiction under title 28’ without it.”  Vaden, 
556 U.S. at 62. 
 
In addition to giving effect to the words of that 
provision, the Court reasoned that failing to look through a 
§ 4 petition to the underlying dispute would have “curious 
practical consequences”: 
 
It would permit a federal court to entertain a § 4 
petition only when a federal-question suit is 
already before the court, when the parties 
satisfy the requirements for diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction, or when the dispute 
over arbitrability involves a maritime contract.  
[Failing to look through] would not 
accommodate a § 4 petitioner who could file a 
federal-question suit in (or remove such a suit 
to) federal court, but who has not done so.  In 
contrast, when the parties’ underlying dispute 
arises under federal law, the “look through” 
approach permits a § 4 petitioner to ask a 
federal court to compel arbitration without first 
taking the formal step of initiating or removing 
a federal-question suit – that is, without seeking 
federal adjudication of the very questions it 
wants to arbitrate rather than litigate. 
 
Id. at 65. 
 
 Neither the textual nor practical considerations noted 
by the Court in Vaden apply in a case relying on § 10 of the 
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FAA.  Section 10 lacks the critical “save for such agreement” 
language that was central to the Supreme Court’s Vaden 
opinion.  It provides that “the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made may make an order 
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the 
arbitration ... .”  9 U.S.C. § 10.  There is no reference to the 
subject matter of the underlying dispute.  Thus, while § 4 
calls for a court to consider whether it would have jurisdiction 
over the “subject matter of a suit arising out of the 
controversy between the parties,” § 10 makes no such 
demand. 
 
 We therefore join other courts in holding that § 4 of 
the FAA should be read differently than § 10 for 
jurisdictional purposes.  Before Vaden, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had noted that, even if § 
4 provides look-through federal question jurisdiction, “the 
same words are not in § 10.”  Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming 
& Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
Earlier still, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit ruled that there was “no reason to artificially 
import the language” of § 4 “into § 10, since we do not 
believe it is necessarily anomalous for Congress to have 
intended that federal courts take jurisdiction for purposes of a 
motion to compel where the underlying dispute is federal, but 
not take jurisdiction on a parallel motion to vacate.”  Minor v. 
Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1996).  
Explaining why Congress may have treated petitions to 
compel arbitration and motions to vacate differently, the 
Seventh Circuit opined that: 
 
The central federal interest was enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate, not review of 
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arbitration decisions.  Thus it would be 
reasonable for Congress to give federal courts 
the responsibility of ensuring arbitration 
agreements are upheld in cases where the courts 
would otherwise have jurisdiction. However, 
once the arbitration agreement is enforced, there 
exists no compelling need for the federal courts 
to be involved, unless a federal question is 
actually at issue or diversity is established. The 
central goal of the FAA will already have been 
addressed, and well-established rules of federal 
jurisdiction, including the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, should govern. Accordingly, 
merely because a district court may have 
jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration 
where an underlying federal question is at stake 
... does not mean the same holds true in the 
context of a § 10 motion to vacate. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks, editorial marks, and citation 
omitted). 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s policy rationale meshes exactly 
with the Vaden Court’s subsequent “practical consequences” 
argument, 556 U.S. at 65, in explaining why look-through 
need not apply in the § 10 context.  As the Supreme Court 
noted in Vaden, the reason for a petition to compel arbitration 
is to resolve the dispute through arbitration rather than going 
to court, so it would be contrary to the purpose of § 4 to 
require the petitioner to first bring suit.  Id. 
 
That logic, however, does not apply to § 10, which 
takes effect only when the arbitration has concluded.  When 
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seeking to vacate the result of an arbitration that has already 
occurred, the movant is challenging the procedural propriety 
of the arbitration, which is unrelated to the subject matter of 
the underlying dispute.  The present case is a prime example.  
The Goldmans complain that they were subject to 
“voluminous” and “oppressive” discovery demands (App. 
289), a “blatantly partial” arbitration panel (App. 289), 
respondents who “blatantly conceal[ed] evidence” (App. 
292), “reprehensible conduct” from CGMI’s lawyers (App. 
293), and mediator “perjury” (App. 293).  Those are 
procedural criticisms.  There is, in other words, no federal 
question which a district court could consider in a § 10 
dispute such as this one; whereas, in a § 4 case, the petitioner 
always could have brought a federal question suit before 
requesting that the court send the matter to arbitration. 
 
 In concluding that Vaden’s “look-through” basis for 
jurisdiction does not extend to § 10 motions to vacate, we 
adopt the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in 
Magruder v. Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC, No. 15-1846, 
2016 WL 1059469 (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 2016).  As discussed 
there, rejecting look-through in cases involving §§ 9 and 10 
of the FAA “harmonizes the law of arbitration with the law of 
contracts.”10  Id. at *3. 
                                              
10 Section 9 of the FAA governs confirmation of 
arbitration awards and provides that “at any time within one 
year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may 
apply to the court ... for an order confirming the award, and 
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award 
is vacated, modified, or corrected ... .”  9 U.S.C. § 9.  Like 
§ 10, § 9 has none of the look-through language of § 4 that 
undergirds the Vaden opinion. 
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Put FINRA and its rules aside for a moment and 
consider what would have happened if [the 
plaintiff] had sued [the defendant] under the 
federal securities laws ... . Most litigation ends 
in settlement – which is to say, in a contract. If 
[the parties] had reached a contractual solution 
but later disagreed about performance, could 
they return to federal court under the securities 
laws? The answer is no. 
 
Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 
(1994)).  In short, “[the] conclusion ... that a federal question 
can suffice to order arbitration under § 4, but not to enforce or 
set aside the decision under § 9 or § 10, parallels the 
distinction ... between an original federal claim and a dispute 
about its contractual resolution.”  Id. 
 
 We therefore hold that a district court may not look 
through a § 10 motion to vacate to the underlying subject 
matter of the arbitration in order to establish federal question 
jurisdiction.  Instead, the traditional well-pleaded complaint 
rule applies so that the motion to vacate must, on its face, 
“necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without 
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal 
and state judicial responsibilities.”  Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. 
 
B. Application of the Well-Pleaded Complaint 
 Rule 
 
Having concluded that we apply the well-pleaded 
complaint rule to § 10 motions, without look-through, we 
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next address the two arguments that the Goldmans make for 
why they have nonetheless established federal question 
jurisdiction. 
 
1. Manifest Disregard 
 
First, the Goldmans argue that their motion to vacate 
raises a substantial federal question on its face because it 
asserts that the arbitration panel showed a manifest disregard 
for federal law.  “Manifest disregard” is a judicially-created 
doctrine by which “[a] district court may ... vacate an 
arbitrator’s decision [that] evidences a manifest disregard for 
the law rather than an erroneous interpretation of the law.”  
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(internal quotation and editorial marks omitted).  The 
Goldmans say that the FINRA panel “manifestly disregarded” 
the statutory language of 15 U.S.C. § 78g,11 as well as its 
implementing regulation 12 C.F.R. § 220.12,12 when it 
                                              
11 As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 78g establishes margin 
requirements “[f]or the purpose of preventing the excessive 
use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities” by 
mandating that “the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System shall ... prescribe rules and regulations with 
respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended 
and subsequently maintained on any security ... .”  Id. 
§ 78g(a). 
 
12 In the portion of 12 C.F.R. § 220.12 relied upon by 
the Goldmans, the regulation provides: 
The required margin for each security position 
held in a margin account shall be as follows: 
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concluded that no margin call had occurred.  (App. 298.)  
Without further explanation, they assert that “[t]he plain 
language” of the regulation demonstrates that a margin call 
must have occurred, contrary to the FINRA panel’s 
conclusion.   
 
The regulation that the Goldmans invoke sets “initial 
margin requirements for certain equity securities at ‘50 
percent of the current market value of the security or the 
percentage set by the regulatory authority where the trade 
occurs, whichever is greater.’”  WC Capital Mgmt., LLC v. 
UBS Sec., LLC, 711 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 12 
C.F.R. § 220.12(a)).  “If the value of the securities and other 
acceptable property held in a margin account falls below the 
required margin level, a broker may issue a ‘margin call’ 
notifying the account owner that it will need to either post 
additional collateral or sell some of its securities in the 
account to satisfy the collateral requirements.”  Id.  
Presumably, the Goldmans are suggesting that their margin 
account fell below the level required by the regulation, so that 
a margin call must have been made. 
                                                                                                     
(a) Margin equity security, except for an 
exempted security, money market 
mutual fund or exempted securities 
mutual fund, warrant on a securities 
index or foreign currency or a long 
position in an option: 50 percent of the 
current market value of the security or 
the percentage set by the regulatory 
authority where the trade occurs, 
whichever is greater. 
Id. § 220.12(a). 
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Without taking a position on the merits of that 
argument, we agree with the District Court that the 
Goldmans’ invocation of 15 U.S.C. § 78g and 12 C.F.R. 
§ 220.12 is insufficient to raise a substantial question of 
federal law in their motion to vacate.  Even if “manifest 
disregard” is a valid basis for vacatur,13 it can only support 
                                              
13 The continued validity of manifest disregard as a 
basis for vacating arbitration awards has been thrown into 
doubt by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. that “§§ 10 and 11 
respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for 
expedited vacatur and modification.”  552 U.S. 576, 584 
(2008).  Subsequently, the Court expressly declined to 
“decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives ... Hall Street 
... as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss 
on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10.”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010).  The Courts of Appeals have 
divided on the answer to that question.  Compare Comedy 
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that manifest disregard survives as 
“shorthand for ... 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which states that the 
court may vacate ‘where the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers’”), with Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
after Hall Street, “‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a 
ground on which a court may reject an arbitrator’s award 
under the Federal Arbitration Act”).  Because we conclude 
that the Goldmans’ manifest disregard claim does not raise a 
substantial question of federal law, we need not inquire into 
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federal question jurisdiction “where ... the petitioner 
complains principally and in good faith that the award was 
rendered in manifest disregard of federal law ... .”  Greenberg 
v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The Goldmans do not meet that standard because the 
legal issues they raise are, at most, merely supportive of their 
principal complaint that partiality, corruption, and ineptitude 
infected the arbitration process.  More broadly, the Goldmans 
fail to establish any of the four parts of the Grable test with 
their manifest disregard claim.  The claim does not 
“necessarily raise a ... federal issue,” nor is the federal issue 
in question “substantial,” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, because 
the margin regulations are invoked simply as evidence for the 
factual claim that a margin call occurred.  That alone does not 
create a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, because 
determining whether the arbitrator “fail[ed] to consider 
pertinent and material evidence” “plainly [does] not require 
resolution of a uniquely federal issue.”  Greenberg, 220 F.3d 
at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In reality, no 
question of federal law is “actually disputed” here.  Grable, 
545 U.S. at 314.  We agree with the District Court that the 
fundamental dispute is not legal at all, but is factual: “no 
party contests the existence, applicability, or construction of 
these statutes and regulations.  Instead, the Goldmans argue 
that the panel erred in its factual determination that no margin 
call occurred.”  (App. 13.)  Finally, we are concerned that 
sweeping this kind of run-of-the-mill arbitration dispute into 
federal court would upset the “prominent role” that state 
                                                                                                     
the continuing validity of manifest disregard as a basis for 
vacatur. 
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courts “play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate” under the 
FAA.  Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59.  Expanding federal question 
jurisdiction to contractual disputes like this one runs the risk 
of “disturbing [the] congressionally approved balance of 
federal and state judicial responsibilities.”  Grable, 545 U.S. 
at 314. 
 
2. FINRA Rules as Federal Law 
 
The Goldmans’ second argument for why they satisfy 
the well-pleaded complaint rule is that FINRA is a self-
regulatory organization authorized by the ’34 Act, and thus 
the alleged violations of FINRA rules raise questions of 
federal law.  The ’34 Act, they say, provides for pervasive 
federal oversight of self-regulatory organizations’ internal 
rules, see 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2)(C), and, consequently, 
allegations of procedural irregularities in the FINRA 
proceedings implicate substantial questions of federal law. 
 
As support, the Goldmans rely principally on the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. v. UBS Securities, 
LLC, 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014).  In that case, a divided 
panel of the Second Circuit held that there was federal 
question jurisdiction to review an arbitration, reasoning that 
the SEC’s pervasive regulation of NASDAQ as a self-
regulatory organization resulted in NASDAQ rules being 
intertwined with federal law.  The NASDAQ case arose from 
serious problems in Facebook’s initial public offering, which 
led UBS to initiate arbitration on state law contract and tort 
claims based on NASDAQ’s alleged failure to follow its own 
rules.  Id. at 1013-15.  When NASDAQ sought declaratory 
judgment in federal court to preclude arbitration, one main 
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issue was whether the case implicated federal question 
jurisdiction.  The Second Circuit concluded that it did, even 
though the allegations arose from NASDAQ rules and New 
York common law.  The Second Circuit pointed out that 
NASDAQ was a registered national exchange under 15 
U.S.C. § 78f, and thus was required to have “rules ... designed 
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices 
[and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade ... .”  
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5).  Because NASDAQ’s rules were 
pervasively regulated under the ’34 Act, and because they 
were meant to implement ’34 Act obligations, the court ruled 
that those federal law obligations were necessarily involved 
in the arbitration that UBS initiated.  NASDAQ, 770 F.3d at 
1021-23.  As to the substantiality component of the test for 
federal question jurisdiction, the Second Circuit determined 
that 
 
the disputed federal issue in [the] case – 
whether NASDAQ violated its Exchange Act 
obligation to provide a fair and orderly market 
in conducting an IPO – is sufficiently 
significant to the development of a uniform 
body of federal securities regulation to satisfy 
the requirement of importance to the federal 
system as a whole. 
 
Id. at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Finally, the 
court ruled that asserting jurisdiction would not upset the 
federal-state balance because of “Congress’s expressed 
preference for alleged violations of the Exchange Act, and of 
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to be litigated 
in a federal forum.”  Id. at 1030. 
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None of that, though, changes the outcome here.  We 
agree with the District Court that, even if the NASDAQ 
opinion’s theory of federal question jurisdiction is correct,14 
its facts are easily distinguishable from the Goldmans’ case 
because it “involved far more substantial questions of federal 
law.”  (App. 15.)  Of high importance to the Second Circuit’s 
substantiality analysis was that NASDAQ was an exchange, 
implicating the “central role stock exchanges play in the 
national system of securities markets.”  NASDAQ, 770 F.3d at 
1024.  The proper functioning of a national securities 
exchange, especially when it comes to its core function of 
properly issuing stock, is clearly a much more significant 
                                              
14 Because the Goldmans’ claims are not nearly as 
substantial for jurisdictional purposes as those in the 
NASDAQ case, we need not reach the question of whether we 
would adopt the Second Circuit’s analysis of federal question 
jurisdiction from the NASDAQ opinion.  We do note, 
however, that the dissenting opinion in NASDAQ makes a 
compelling argument that “NASDAQ is a shareholder-owned, 
publicly-traded, for-profit company,” “its rules are not federal 
regulations or federal law,” and “the rules of a stock exchange 
are contractual in nature and within the province of state 
law.”  770 F.3d at 1036 (Straub, J., dissenting).  As with the 
Goldmans’ case, “[t]he only arguably federal issue present” in 
the NASDAQ case was “a broad duty found in the Exchange 
Act” that was “not actually disputed.”  Id.  The strong 
dissenting argument in NASDAQ suggests that the case was at 
the borderline of raising a sufficiently substantial issue of 
federal law to justify federal question jurisdiction.  The 
Goldmans’ claims much less directly implicate federal 
securities regulation, so that if NASDAQ is close to the border 
of satisfying the Grable test, the Goldmans are far from it. 
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issue of federal securities law than the arbitration procedures 
of a non-exchange self-regulatory organization. 
 
“The substantiality inquiry ... looks ... to the 
importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”  
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066.  It “primarily focuse[s] not on the 
interests of the litigants themselves, but rather on the broader 
significance ... for the Federal Government.”  Id.  The 
Goldmans raise a routine claim for vacatur alleging arbitrator 
and counterparty misconduct, which is, at bottom, a 
commonplace state law contract dispute.  Unlike the 
NASDAQ case, which implicated the proper functioning of a 
major national securities exchange, nothing about the 
Goldmans’ case is likely to affect the securities markets more 
broadly.  That the allegedly misbehaving arbitration panel 
happened to be affiliated with a self-regulatory organization 
does not meaningfully distinguish this case from any other 
suit alleging arbitrator partiality in a securities dispute.  
Accordingly, we decline to recognize federal question 
jurisdiction over the flood of cases that would enter federal 
courts if the involvement of a self-regulatory organization 
were itself sufficient to support jurisdiction.  See Grable, 545 
U.S. at 318 (expressing concern with finding a substantial 
federal question in a state law claim when that “would have 
meant a tremendous number of cases” could enter federal 
court). 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing the Goldmans’ suit for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
